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Abstract When visual attention is directed away from a stim-
ulus, neural processing is weak and strength and precision of
sensory data decreases. From a computational perspective, in
such situations observers should give more weight to prior
expectations in order to behave optimally during a discrimi-
nation task. Here we test a signal detection theoretic model
that counter-intuitively predicts subjects will do just the oppo-
site in a discrimination task with two stimuli, one attended and
one unattended: when subjects are probed to discriminate the
unattended stimulus, they rely less on prior information about
the probed stimulus’ identity. The model is in part inspired by
recent findings that attention reduces trial-by-trial variability
of the neuronal population response and that they use a com-
mon criterion for attended and unattended trials. In five dif-
ferent visual discrimination experiments, when attention was
directed away from the target stimulus, subjects did not adjust
their response bias in reaction to a change in stimulus presen-
tation frequency despite being fully informed and despite the
presence of performance feedback and monetary and social in-
centives. This indicates that subjects did not rely more on the
priors under conditions of inattention as would be predicted by a
Bayes-optimal observer model. These results inform and con-
strain future models of Bayesian inference in the human brain.
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Introduction
According to ideal observer Bayesian principles, when per-
ceptual information or perceptual processing are weak, opti-
mal observers should rely more on prior expectations in order
to behave optimally (Feldman & Friston, 2010; Friston, 2005;
Knill & Pouget, 2004; Kouider, de Gardelle, Sackur, &
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Dupoux, 2010; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014; Summerfield
& Egner, 2009; Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008). For in-
stance, in a discrimination task, Bayes-optimal subjects capi-
talize on prior knowledge about the stimulus presentation
probability to maximize the proportion of correct responses
(Maddox & Bohil, 1998; Wyart, Nobre, & Summerfield,
2012). Such a strategy should be manifested in terms of a shift
in subjects’ response criteria, e.g., as strength or precision of
sensory data decreases, such as for unattended stimuli
(Carrasco, 2011), when stimulus presentation probability is
biased the optimal discrimination criterion should become
more liberal.
Here we test a signal detection theoretic model (Rahnev
et al., 2011) that makes empirical predictions that may seem
implausible from this commonsensical Bayesian perspective.
According to our Common Criterion Model, in addition to
increasing the strength of the perceptual signal (possibly by
increasing activity in visual cortical areas that represent the
attended location and suppressing cortical activity that repre-
sents unattended locations (Desimone & Duncan, 1995)), at-
tention also reduces the trial-by-trial variability of the internal
perceptual response (Bressler & Silver, 2010; Pestilli,
Carrasco, Heeger, & Gardner, 2011; Wyart et al., 2012).
Importantly, motivated by previous empirical evidence within
a signal detection theoretic framework (Gorea & Sagi, 2000;
Zak, Katkov, Gorea, & Sagi, 2012), the model also presup-
poses that subjects use a single common decision criterion for
discriminating both attended and unattended stimuli. This mod-
el has gathered empirical support from studies using transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation and neuroimaging (Rahnev, Bahdo,
de Lange, & Lau, 2012a; Rahnev, Maniscalco, Luber, Lau, &
Lisanby, 2012b; Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, &
Lau, 2010). The model makes the counterintuitive prediction
that as long as there is uncertainty, when faced with a biased
prior expectation of stimulus likelihood, human subjects will
not be able to adjust their response bias in unattended trials as
effectively as they will for attended trials.
We pit this model against the predictions of an Optimal
Observer Model in a series of experiments in which subjects
discriminated between left- and right-tilted gratings that were
presented in cued (attended) or uncued (unattended or less
attended) locations, one of which was probed in each trial.
To anticipate, we confirmed the a priori prediction of our
detection theoretic model repeatedly in five different experi-
ments (plus one control experiment).
Materials and methods
Participants
Participants signed an informed-consent statement approved
by the local institutional review board. Subjects had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve to the purpose of
the experiments. They received a base compensation of
US$10 per session plus a US$5 bonus if they had a higher
percentage correct than the previous participant (whose per-
formance was disclosed only at the end of the experiment).
The first subject of each experiment competed against a mock
subject who was given an arbitrary percentage of 80 % correct
responses. This reward structure provided subjects with both
monetary and social incentives to perform well in the task. A
total of 79 subjects took part in this study. The mean age of
participants was 23 years (range = 18–41 years).
Stimuli
Stimuli were generated using Psychophysics Toolbox
(Brainard, 1997) in MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA,
USA) and were shown on an iMac monitor (24-in monitor
size, 1920 × 1200 pixels, 60 Hz refresh rate). Stimuli were
presented inside circular locations (5° diameter) on a gray
background (111 cd/m2), with circles’ centers 5° away from
fixation. Stimuli consisted of a noisy background composed
of uniformly distributed intensity values with gratings on top
(two cycles/degree) that could be tilted 45° (right) or 135°
(left). Total contrast of stimuli was fixed at 30 % but the
grating-to-noise ratio varied, thus making the gratings more
or less visible.
General task design
Here we present the general design of our experiments. For
details and variations, see the Experiment and task design
section of each experiment.
Seated in a dimmed room (60 cm from the monitor), sub-
jects were instructed to fixate at a central red square (0.4°) for
500 ms at the beginning of each trial. Subjects were instructed
to attend to one of two possible locations pointed by a white
(200 cd/m2) pre-cue double-headed arrow presented for
500 ms, which randomly changed orientation every 40 trials.
This blocking of attentional cueing reduced the cognitive de-
mands on subjects and made it less likely that they could
confuse the identity of cued stimulus. Stimuli were presented
for 50 ms inside four circular locations (5° diameter) on a gray
background (111 cd/m2) on the four quadrants of the screen,
with the center of each circle 5° away from fixation. This
configuration was chosen in order to minimize eye move-
ments and enhance central fixation, as in previous studies
(Bahrami, Lavie, & Rees, 2007; Rahnev et al., 2011).
The tilt of the gratings was always the same in the two
locations of each diagonal, thus the gratings in one diagonal
can be considered as a single compound stimulus. The tilts of
the gratings on different diagonals were always independent.
After stimulus presentation, a response cue consisting of two
white circles at the same location of the stimuli of one of the
2022 Atten Percept Psychophys (2015) 77:2021–2036
two diagonals indicated the target stimulus for which subjects
had to provide a perceptual judgment regarding the tilt (left or
right) of the gratings. The response cue coincided with the pre-
cue on 70% of the trials (cued) and it selected the stimulus that
was not pre-cued in the remaining 30 % of trials (uncued).
After providing a perceptual judgment, subjects rated confi-
dence on a 4-point scale (1 = not confident at all; 2 = barely
confident; 3 = somewhat confident; 4 = highly confident).
Perceptual judgments were provided with two fingers from
the left hand on a normal keyboard, pressing one key for right
tilt and a different key for left tilt. Confidence ratings were
provided with four different keys with a different finger of the
right hand for each key. Subjects received auditory feedback
(a brief low-pitch beep) after an incorrect answer at the end of
the trial and their overall performance (percentage correct)
was shown to them every 40 trials. We note that the aim of
collecting confidence ratings was to assess subjects’
metacognitive capacity, but since they are irrelevant for the
scope of this report regarding integration of prior information
in perceptual decisions, we will not analyze them.
A session took approximately 1 hour to complete and
consisted of 240 practice and 800 experimental trials. Two
conditions were tested: in the unbiased condition, left and
right tilts on the target stimuli were equally likely; in the bi-
ased condition, 70 % of the target stimuli were tilted to one
side and 30 % to the other (i.e., 70 % of cued and 70 % of
uncued trials were biased to one side and the remaining 30 %
of each to the other side). The biased tilt was constant through-
out the biased blocks in each experiment. Subjects were ex-
plicitly informed of the attentional and bias conditions, were
reminded of them before every block, and had the chance to
become familiar with the structure of the experiment during
practice trials. The experimental trials were split into four
blocks (two interleaved blocks for the unbiased and biased
condit ions, respect ively; presentat ion order was
counterbalanced across subjects). Participants had 15-second
forced pauses every 40 trials, after which they were informed
of their accumulated percentage correct. Subjects had self-
paced pauses between blocks. Before the experiment, subjects
completed 240 practice trials that followed the same structure
of the main experiment except that they were split into six
blocks: three per each type of bias. In the first four practice
blocks stimuli were presented at higher grating-to-noise con-
trast ratio than in the actual experiment and in the last two
blocks they had the same contrast ratio as in the actual exper-
iment. Practice results were not analyzed.
Rationale for theoretical predictions
In our experiments, observers had to classify a binary stimulus
as being S1 or S2. According to Signal Detection Theory
(SDT) (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman,
2005), when the stimulus is S1, an internal perceptual response
x is drawn in the brain of the observer with probability distribu-
tion P(x/S1). Similarly, x follows P(x/S2) when the stimulus is S2.
We assume that the distributions corresponding to S1 and S2
stimuli are Gaussian with equal variance (see Fig. 1a for an
illustration). On every trial, x is compared with a decision crite-
rion xc such that if x> xc, the observer’s response is S2; otherwise,
the response is S1. For simplicity, in this section we consider that
P(x/S2) and P(x/S1) have means = ±μ/2 and variance = σ
2.
Bayes-optimal observer
A Bayes-optimal observer infers the most probable stimulus
on every trial, given x, using Bayes rule. Conceptually, it cal-
culates the decision variable d xð Þ ¼ logP S2jxð ÞP S1jxð Þ and responds
S1 if d(x) < 0 and S2 if d(x)>0. Using Bayes rule, decision
variable d becomes
d xð Þ ¼ logP xjS2ð Þ
P xjS1ð Þ þ log
P S2ð Þ
P S1ð Þ ð1Þ
The decision rule can be expressed in terms of x. Replacing
the probabilities P(x|S1) and P(x|S2) by the corresponding for-






P S2ð Þ ð2Þ
where P(S1) and P(S2) are a priori probabilities that the stim-
ulus is S1 and S2, respectively. Observers using the decision
criterion given by Eq. 2 effectively maximize the correct re-
sponse probability, assuming μ and σ are constant. We assume
they are constant because, unlike the observer’s subjective
decision criterion, they are determined by observers’ percep-
tual systems (σ is not under subjects’ control) and the task’s
structure (in our experiments, μ is determined by the stimulus’
contrast) and thus can be considered objective variables.
Figure 1a shows P(x|S1), P(x|S2) and the location of the
optimal criterion given by Eq. 2 (dashed vertical lines) assum-
ing that S1 is more probable than S2 (P(S1):P(S2) = 70:30). In
each panel, the distributions have different σ but the same μ,
therefore sensitivity (d ′ = μ/σ) is different. Note that optimal
observers shift the decision criterion to account for biased
prior probabilities. Also, the criterion is larger when sensitiv-
ity decreases. This makes sense, as an optimal observer should
capitalize on prior knowledge about what stimulus is more
probable, especially when sensory information is weak.
Signal Detection Theory offers different measures to quan-
tify response bias. The most common is c, defined as the
position of the criterion xc relative to σ, i.e., c = xc/σ.
Therefore, using Eq. 2, the optimal c is:
copt ¼ 1d0 log
P S1ð Þ
P S2ð Þ ð3Þ
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A second measure of bias is β (or logβ for convenience),
defined as the ratio between the probabilities P(x|S2) and
P(x|S1) at the location of the criterion (x = xc). The advantage
of β is that the optimal β, as opposed to c, is independent of
the observers’ performance. In fact, at the location of the cri-
terion (d = 0), Eq. 1 implies that:
logβopt ¼ log
P S1ð Þ
P S2ð Þ ð4Þ
Figure 1b illustrates the relationship between optimal re-
sponse bias and sensitivity. Whereas copt increases when sen-
sitivity d′ decreases, logβopt is constant. The location of the
optimal decision criterion when stimulus presentation prior
probabilities of S1 and S2 are not equal, which is the case in
our experiments, depends on sensitivity d′ (as illustrated in
Fig. 1a) and hence it varies across subjects and across atten-
tional conditions. However, optimal logβ is constant for all
subjects regardless of sensitivity: it only depends on the stim-
uli frequencies. In our study, then, logβ is a preferable mea-
sure for subjects’ response bias because we can easily com-
pare it to an optimal logβ that is independent of d′ and con-
stant across subjects when we bias the stimulus presentation
frequencies.
Fixed-criterion observer
Subjects setting a criterion different to the optimal given by
Eq. 2 will perform worse than they potentially could. One
suboptimal strategy worth considering is the one that our
Common Criterion Model assumes: subjects use the same
common decision criterion (xc
fixed) for discriminating both
attended and unattended stimuli, despite differences in sensi-
tivity. An intuitive understanding of the model’s predictions
can be gained considering the fixed decision criterion in
Fig. 1a (solid vertical lines). Using this suboptimal strategy,
c and logβ both increase when d′ increases (Fig. 1b, solid
line). More importantly, the worse the sensitivity is (weak
visual information), the larger the divergence between a sub-
optimal and an ideal observer. In other words, there is a less
efficient use of prior knowledge when visual evidence is
weak. This suboptimal behavior is what our Common
Criterion Model predicts will happen in unattended trials in
our experiments (see Experiment 1 below for details on the
model). Also note that with equal stimulus presentation prob-
abilities (i.e., P(S1):P(S2) = 50:50), Eq. 4 implies that optimal
logβ = 0, meaning that optimal observers place their criterion
at the intersection of the S1 and S2 distributions (xc = 0), re-
gardless of their sensitivity d′.
Signal detection theoretic measures
We estimate sensitivity (d′) with the standard signal detection
theoretic formula:
d0 ¼ z HRð Þ − z FARð Þ ð5Þ
where HR is the hit rate and FAR the false alarm rate, and the z
transformation converts these rates to a z score (i.e., to stan-
dard deviation units). Response bias measures can also be
expressed in terms of HR and FAR as:
Fig. 1 Optimal (and suboptimal) decisions in a perceptual discrimination
task using Signal Detection Theory (SDT). The figure illustrates the
divergent behavior of an optimal observer and an observer with a fixed
criterion, especially when sensitivity is low. In a discrimination task with
binary stimuli (S1 and S2) where S1 is more frequent than S2 at a 70:30
ratio, SDT assumes that when a stimulus is presented to the observer, an
internal perceptual response is generated in the brain of the observer with
a Gaussian distribution: P(x|S1) when the stimulus is S1 and P(x|S2) when
the stimulus is S2. If x is larger than a decision criterion, the observer’s
response is S2; S1 otherwise. a Each plot shows P(x|S1) (orange) and
P(x|S2) (blue) for three different sensitivities (d′). Dashed vertical lines
indicate the location of the optimal criterion (Eq. 1). Solid vertical lines
indicate a fixed criterion. b Response bias measures c (optimal value
given by Eq. 3; otherwise calculated using Eq. 6) and logβ (optimal
value given by Eq. 4; otherwise calculated using Eq. 7) as a function of
sensitivity for hypothetical subjects using an optimal criterion (dashed
lines) and those using a fixed criterion (solid lines). [All figures use
colorblind safe colors following Brewer (2013)]
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c ¼ − 1
2
z HRð Þ þ z FARð Þ½  ð6Þ
and
logβ ¼ − 1
2
z HRð Þ2 − z FARð Þ2
h i
ð7Þ
The latter is easily obtained because both measures of re-
sponse bias are related through the expression logβ = c⋅d ′
(Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005).
Experiment 1: Smaller response bias shift in uncued
trials compared to cued trials during biased stimulus
presentation
Experiment and task design
Eighteen subjects (12 women) participated in this experiment.
The grating contrast contribution to total contrast (i.e., 30 %)
changed randomly across trials between low (5.7 %) and high
(9 %) levels. Half of the cued and uncued trials in each bias
condition had a low contrast-contributing grating and the oth-
er half had high contrast-contributing grating. Subjects com-
pleted one session (see Fig. 2 and Materials and methods
section for details).
Optimal observer and common criterion model
predictions
In our experiments, on each trial, stimuli are presented at a
cued and at an uncued location. Consequently, in the models,
there are two internal response axes, one for the cued location
and one for the uncued location.
Bayes-optimal observers are free to use two different
criteria to make decisions in cued and uncued trials. In
Fig. 3a we present the predictions of the Optimal Observer
Model for Experiment 1 when the prior stimulus probabilities
are biased. In this Experiment, the contrast was the same for
cued and uncued locations, therefore in the models the differ-
ence between the mean of the distributions S1 (i.e., left-tilted
stimuli) and S2 (i.e., right-tilted stimuli) is the same for cued
and uncued distributions. Attention modulates the variance of
the distributions. When observers pay attention, their objec-
tive performance is better. This is exemplified in the distribu-
tions plotted in Fig. 3a (top). In this example, at an attended
location, d′ = 1.5, and d′ = 0.5 at an unattended location. The
optimal location of criteria is given by Eq. 2. As shown in
Fig. 3a (bottom), optimal observers shift their decision crite-
rion in such a way that logβ is the same for both decisions.
In contrast, the ‘Common Criterion Model’ assumes that
observers use a common criterion for cued and uncued stimuli
(Gorea & Sagi, 2000; Zak et al., 2012). As a consequence, it
makes very different predictions (Fig. 3b). This assumption is
informed by previous empirical psychophysical evidence
(Gorea & Sagi, 2000). In this case, because d′ is not the same
for attended and unattended distributions, a common criterion
implies that response bias cannot be optimal for both locations
when stimuli presentation frequencies are biased. The predic-
tion is that in attended trials, the response bias will be closer to
optimal and, hence, further away from optimal in the unat-
tended trials. This is the opposite of what Bayes-optimal ob-
servers would do: when vision is impaired (as during inatten-
tion), they shift response bias by a larger amount. In Fig. 3c we
present the model predictions for the unbiased condition,
which are the same for both the Optimal Observer and the
Common Criterion Models. When stimulus presentation is
unbiased, both models predict optimal response bias.
Results
As expected due to matched stimulation conditions, subjects
showed a higher sensitivity (d′) for discriminating the cued
stimuli than for uncued stimuli (paired t tests: unbiased:
T(17) = 4.37, P = 0.0004, CI = [0.62,1.78]; biased: T(17) =
Fig. 2 Main task design. Each trial began with a fixation point followed
by a pre-cue arrow indicating the diagonal to which subjects should
attend. After stimulus presentation (same tilt for stimuli in the same
diagonal), a response cue (white circles) indicated the diagonal for
which subjects had to provide a perceptual judgment regarding the tilt
(left or right) of the gratings. Subjects received auditory feedback after an
incorrect answer. The response cue coincided with the pre-cue on 70% of
the trials (cued) and it was different in the remaining 30 % (uncued). In
the unbiased condition (two 200-trial blocks), left and right tilts were
equally likely. In the biased condition (two 200-trial blocks), 70 % of
the response-cued stimuli were tilted to one side and 30 % to the other.
This design was used for Experiments 1, 2, and 4 (see Materials and
methods section for details)
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4.05, P = 0.0008, CI = [0.54,1.70]; Fig. 4a). For hit and false
alarm rates, see Fig. S1 in Supplemental Information.
Response bias measured by c, as expected by our model’s
prediction (Fig. 3b, c), was not significantly different between
attentional conditions in either bias condition (paired t tests
between cued and uncued conditions, unbiased: T(17) = 0.93,
P = 0.36, CI = [−0.27,0.10]; biased: T(17) = 0.08, P = 0.93, CI
= [−0.28,0.30]; Fig. 4b).
In the unbiased condition, logβ was not different from
optimality for cued and uncued trials, i.e., optimal logβ = 0
for a left-tilted and right-tilted stimulus presentation ratio of
50:50 (see Eq. 4 in Materials and methods section; t tests
against value zero, cued: T(17) = 0.55; P = 0.59, CI =
[−0.17,0.29]; uncued: T(17) =−0.03, P = 0.97, CI = [−0.14,
0.14]). When the stimulus probability changed from unbiased
(i.e., the ratio of left-tilted to right-tilted stimuli being 50:50) to
biased (in all our experiments the same ratio now being
70:30), the shift in subjects’ response bias as measured by
log β was farther from optimality in unattended trials than in
attended trials (Fig. 4c). Critically, there was a significant in-
teraction between attention (cued vs. uncued) and bias (biased
vs. unbiased) (2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA, F(1,17) =
7.26, P = 0.01)
Discussion
The shift in response bias measured by logβ due to biased
stimulus presentation was not numerically optimal on average
in attended trials (as it is not unexpected based on previous
Fig. 3 Model predictions for Experiment 1. Biased Condition: aOptimal
Observer Model. Top: Internal response distributions for stimuli
presented in the attended and unattended locations of the visual field
(orange: P(x|S1); blue: P(x|S2)). The unattended internal response has a
higher variance. In Experiment 1 the contrast at the attended location was
the same as in the unattended location. To account for this, the distance
between the mean values of the responses is unchanged with attention.
The same means with a higher variance implies lower sensitivity (see
Materials and methods). In the biased condition, the stimulus
presentation probability was such that P(S1):P(S2) = 70:30. The optimal
localization of the criterion (Eq. 1), i.e., the one that leads to maximum
accuracy, is shown as vertical dashed lines. Bottom: Sensitivity (d′) is
worse in the unattended location. Response bias reflects the fact that an
optimal subject uses prior information about the stimulus proportions and
adjusts criterion accordingly: c is larger for unattended trials (Eq. 6) but
logβ is the same (Eq. 7). b Common Criterion Model. Top: Distributions
are the same as in (a). However, this model assumes that subjects use the
same criterion for both attended and unattended trials. Bottom: Sensitivity
does not depend on criterion, therefore it is the same as in (a). Response
bias (measured by c) is positive but in the unattended condition it is closer
to zero (as opposed to the optimal observers predictions). In this model,
response bias (measured by logβ) cannot be jointly optimal for both
attentional conditions. Criterion shift induces a bias that is closer to
optimal in the attended condition (for comparison, optimal logβ are
shown in dashed lines). Parameters of the shown distributions are
arbitrary. c Unbiased Condition: Since sensitivity does not depend on
response bias, the prediction for d′ is the same as in the biased condition.
When the stimulus presentation probability is unbiased (such that
P(S1):P(S2) = 50:50), both the Optimal Observer and the Common
Criterion Models make the same prediction regarding subjects’ response
bias: as measured by c and by logβ subjects are optimal
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literature (Gorea & Sagi, 2000; Green & Swets, 1966;
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Rahnev et al., 2011)), but it
was significant and in the right direction. On the other hand,
the shift in uncued trials lagged behind the shift in cued trials,
as if subjects were unable to adjust their response bias during
inattention.
Note that the shift in response bias as measured by c is
similar in the biased cued and uncued conditions (Fig. 4b).
This, however, does not imply that subjects were equally close
to optimality, since optimal c (not shown) is different for cued
and uncued because d′ was significantly different and it varied
for every subject (see Eq. 3). These results, then, support a
model in which the variance of the internal signal distributions
is modulated by attention and subjects use a common criterion
such that they are closer to optimality in cued trials than in
uncued trials.
Experiment 2: Multiple sessions and higher contrast
Worried that the results in Experiment 1 were obtained only
due to subjects’ lack of familiarity with the task or extreme
difficulty during unattended trials, in Experiment 2 we tested
each subject for at least two 1-hour-long sessions (three sub-
jects had four sessions), giving them ample opportunity to
learn to behave more optimally. We also made the task some-
what easier during the unattended trials by increasing the
mean contrast of both stimuli.
Experiment and task design
Each session was run in the exact same fashion as in
Experiment 1. Participants (13 subjects; seven women), how-
ever, had two sessions, one with low and one with high
contrast-contributing gratings (except for three participants
who had four sessions, two with low and two with high con-
trasts). Statistics are presented for the subjects’ average across
sessions. Different sessions took place on different days with-
in 1 week. Contrast levels were higher overall than in
Experiment 1 to allow an increase in sensitivity for uncued
trials. In Experiment 2 contribution of the grating contrast to
total contrast was 9 % (low) and 12.3 % (high), instead of the
lower levels in Experiment 1 of 5.7 % (low) and 9 % (high).
Results
Detection sensitivity (d′) in cued and uncued trials differed in
the unbiased and biased conditions (paired t tests, T(12) = 5.83,
P = 0.00008, CI = [1.1,2.4] and T(12) = 6.35,P = 0.00004, CI =
[1.15,2.35], respectively; see Fig. 5a). Overall discrimination
sensitivity was higher than in Experiment 1 (Experiment 1
mean cued = 1.44, uncued = 0.28; Experiment 2 mean cued =
2.46, uncued = 0.71), reflecting the benefit from the extra train-
ing and the fact that we raised the contribution of grating con-
trast from amean of 7.4% in Experiment 1 to a mean of 10.7%
in this experiment. See Fig. S2 in the Supplemental Information
for hit and false alarm rates.
Response bias as measured by c was different between
attentional conditions in both bias conditions (paired t tests
between cued and uncued conditions, unbiased: T(12) =
4.50, P = 0.001, CI = [0.18,0.51]; biased: T(12) = 2.33, P =
0.04, CI = [0.01,0.43]; Fig. 5b). Importantly, in the unbiased
condition, logβwas not different from optimality (0) for cued
and uncued trials (t tests against value zero, T(12) =−0.06,
P = 0.96, CI = [−0.48,0.46] and T(12) = 1.79, P = 0.10,
CI = [−0.05,0.47], respectively). In the biased condition,
despite the extra training, the higher overall sensitivity, and
response bias c being higher on average for the unattended
condition, logβ shifted towards optimality (dashed line) in cued
trials much more than it did in uncued trials. Importantly, as in
the previous experiment, there was a significant interaction
between attention and bias (2 × 2 repeated measures
ANOVA, F(1,12) = 8.71, P = 0.01).
Fig. 4 Results for Experiment 1. a Detection sensitivity (d′) differed
between cued and uncued stimuli for both the unbiased and biased
conditions. b Response bias measured by c. c In the unbiased condition,
logβ (log-likelihood ratio evaluated at the criterion) was near optimality
(0) for cued and uncued trials. However, in the biased condition, logβ
shifted towards optimality only for cued but not for uncued trials. Solid
bars indicate means and error bars SEM. **P ≤ 0.01 ***P < 0.001
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Discussion
Higher sensitivity and extended training did not change signif-
icantly the pattern of results we found in Experiment 1. The
mean response bias as measured by c was higher in uncued
trials (in both the unbiased and biased conditions). Note, how-
ever, that the shift was not enough for making logβ approach
optimality in the same proportion as in the cued trials. This
indicates that, despite the larger average shift in c, they were
further away from optimality in uncued trials. The Optimal
Observer Model predicted that a higher response bias c during
inattention should have led to an equally optimal logβ for cued
and uncued trials if subjects were being optimal. We did not see
this in our data. Rather, as we explained above (Materials and
methods; Figs. 1b and 3), response bias c, when distributions
have different variances, is not particularly informative about
how the two values of c compare to each other. Log β, on the
other hand, is a much better measure for determining how close
to optimality subjects’ response bias is because optimal logβ is
the same regardless of variance or sensitivity. The results of this
experiment, then, add evidence to the results from Experiment
1 to support our CommonCriterionModel insofar as our model
predicts that subjects would be able to shift their log βmore in
cued than in uncued trials.
Experiment 3: Low sensitivity and general
inattention alone are not enough to prevent response
bias shifting
The fact that discrimination sensitivity was relatively low for
unattended stimuli in the first two experiments could be a
source of concern. Subjects might have been frustrated and
resolved to respond more or less randomly during unattended
trials, i.e., in a 50/50 fashion. We note that sensitivity (d′) for
uncued trials was significantly positive in both Experiments 1
and 2, and in Experiment 2 it was within a range that is not
atypical in psychophysics experiments (mean uncued d′ =
0.71). Nevertheless, we performed Experiment 3 to test the
hypothesis that it was the combination of attended and unat-
tended trials in the same task rather than low d′ or just a
general lack of attention that prevented subjects from shifting
their response bias adequately in reaction to changes in their
prior expectation in the uncued trials. Recall, our model pre-
dicted that a common criterion for cued and uncued trials
would prevent subjects’ response bias from being equally
close to optimality in both types of trial. If it were just inat-
tention or just low sensitivity that drives the inability to shift
response bias that we saw in Experiments 1 and 2, subjects
should be unable to shift their criterion towards optimality in
Experiment 3 as well.
Experiment and task design
There were ten participants in Experiment 3 (seven women).
The experiment was carried out following the task design of
Experiment 2, except for the following points. First, there was
no attentional pre-cue/cue arrow before or during stimulus
presentation, ensuring attention was equally divided between
the stimuli in the two diagonals (Fig. 6). Circles randomly
probed one of the two diagonals in half of the trials. Second,
grating contribution to contrast was decreased to ensure lower
sensitivity. Subjects had one session with low (3.7 %) and
another with high contrast-contributing gratings (7.3 %).
Two participants withdrew from the experiment after complet-
ing only one session (one subject had low contrast and the
other had high contrast). We note that these two manipulations
were meant to mimic the unattended conditions of the previ-
ous two experiments in terms of low sensitivity without hav-
ing two different attentional conditions.
Fig. 5 Results for Experiment 2. a Similar task as in Experiment 1, with
at least two sessions per subject and increased grating contrast. Overall
sensitivity was increased and subjects showed higher sensitivity (d′) to
cued than to uncued stimuli. b Response bias measured by c. c In the
unbiased condition, logβ was near optimality for cued and uncued trials
and not different from each other. In the biased condition, logβ shifted
towards optimality only in cued but not in the uncued trials. Solid bars
indicate subjects’means and error bars SEM. *P < 0.05 **P≤0.01 ***P ≤
0.001
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Results
Detection sensitivity (d′) was lower (mean = 0.63) than uncued
d′ in Experiment 2 (mean = 0.71). Sensitivity in Experiment 3
was higher than in uncued d′ from Experiment 1 (mean = 0.28),
but it was still less than half of cued d′ (mean = 1.44).
Sensitivity was not different between conditions (paired t test,
T(9) = 1.1, P = 0.30, CI = [−0.06,0.16]; Fig. 7a). For hit and
false alarm rates, see Fig. S3 in the Supplemental Information.
Response bias as measured by c was different between con-
ditions (paired t test: T(9) = 6.9, P = 0.0001, CI = [0.38,0.76];
Fig. 7b). Like in the unbiased conditions from previous experi-
ments, in this experiment subjects displayed an optimal response
bias measured by logβ during the unbiased condition (t test
against value zero, T(9) = 0.47, P = 0.65, CI = [−0.11,0.07];
Fig. 7c). However, unlike the uncued conditions in Experiments
1 and 2, in this experiment subjects were able to shift their
response bias significantly towards optimality (dashed line) in
the biased condition (Fig. 7c). Importantly, response bias in the
biased condition was significantly different from the unbiased
condition (paired t test, T(9) = 3.65,P= 0.005, CI = [0.10,0.42]).
Discussion
The shift in logβ was achieved even when discrimination
sensitivity was at a low level, comparable to that in the uncued
condition in Experiments 1 and 2. This finding is critical be-
cause a significant shift in logβ despite such a low d′ implies
that subjects were free to incorporate the priors about stimulus
identity into their response bias. This suggests that, consistent
with our Common Criterion Model (Fig. 3b), it is a common
criterion for an attended and an unattended sets of distribu-
tions, rather than low sensitivity overall, that led to suboptimal
behavior.
Experiment 4: Subjects fail to shift their response
bias during inattention even when performance
is matched
Another concern about the results in the first two experiments
is that the different response bias shift was driven by the dif-
ferent performance in cued and uncued trials. Furthermore,
despite the results of Experiment 3, a remaining concern could
be that subjects behave erratically during uncued trials when
these are mixed with cued trials, like in the tasks in
Experiments 1 and 2. To rule out these possibilities we con-
ducted Experiments 4A and 4B, in which we tried to match
sensitivity between the cued and uncued trials by presenting a
higher grating contrast in the uncued location.
Experiment and task design
Experiments 4A and 4B were similar in structure and design
to Experiment 1. Eleven participants in Experiment 4A (three
women) and sixteen in Experiment 4B (seven women) had
one session only. Like in previous experiments, the biased tilt
was constant throughout the biased blocks and it was
counterbalanced across subjects. The only difference was that
contrast for cued and uncued trials was different. In
Experiments 4A and 4B we aimed to match sensitivity (d′)
between cued and uncued trials using the QUEST threshold
determination procedure (Watson & Pelli, 1983) to find for
each subject the grating contribution to total contrast that
would produce about 75% correct responses for both the cued
and uncued stimuli. In Experiment 4A we used 120 practice
trials for QUEST; 70 % of these were cued and were used to
determine the grating contrast contribution to total contrast for
cued stimuli, while the remaining 30% of trials (uncued) were
used to determine the grating contrast contribution of uncued
stimuli. Halfway through the experiment, i.e., after one block
of each condition, we updated this ratio for the cued or uncued
stimuli (or both) to force d′ for both type of trials to be as
similar as possible. We lowered or raised the grating-to-
noise contrast ratio using the psychometric function obtained
during QUEST in order to decrease d′ if it was higher than 1 or
raise it if it was lower than 1. Mean grating contrast contribu-
tion during the first half were: cued = 15.1 % ±9.2; uncued =
Fig. 6 Task design for Experiment 3. The task in Experiment 3 was
similar to the task in Experiment 2 except that there was no pre-cue/cue
arrow and contrast was lower. Subjects’ attention was equally divided
between both diagonals and response circles were equally likely to be
on either diagonal. See Experiment and task design of Experiment 3 for
details
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23.7 % ± 11.3, and during the second half: cued = 11.9 %
±8.1; uncued = 23.3 % ± 13.1.
In Experiment 4B, we used 80 practice trials for QUEST,
70 % of which were cued and were used to determine the
grating contrast contribution for cued stimuli. The uncued
grating contrast contribution was equal to e(log(x)+k), where x
is the grating contrast contribution obtained with QUEST for
cued stimuli and the constant k = 0.7 was determined by
obtaining the mean difference between the natural logarithm
of the grating contrast contributions to total contrast for cued
and uncued stimuli of participants in Experiment 4A. We did
not readjust the ratios halfway through the experiment. Mean
grating contrast contribution for cued stimuli were: cued =
35.9 % ± 28.3; uncued = 46.9 % ± 31.
Figure 8 illustrates the predictions of the models when d′ is
matched. Although the predictions are essentially the same as
for Experiment 1 (Fig. 3), it is important to show that it is the
difference in variance, and not sensitivity, that drives the main
effect predicted by our Common Criterion Model.
Results
In Experiments 4A and 4B we observed a similar pattern of
results. In the biased condition, logβ shifted towards optimal-
ity only in the cued trials (paired t tests, Experiment 4A: T(10)
= 2.63, P = 0.02, CI = [0.07,0.91]; Experiment 4B: T(15) =
2.85, P = 0.01, CI = [0.08,0.54]). Overall, sensitivity was not
significantly different between the cued and uncued condi-
tions in either Experiment 4A (paired t test, unbiased: P =
0.22; biased: P = 0.11) or 4B (paired t test, unbiased: P =
0.39; biased: P = 0.41). However, d′ matching was not always
perfect for every subject, most likely because subjects had
more opportunity to learn how to improve their sensitivity in
the attended trials, which were presented more frequently.
The motivation of these experiments was to test whether
the same pattern of response bias shifts that we observed in the
previous experiments would be preserved when sensitivity in
cued and uncued trials was matched. For this reason, to
achieve better sensitivity matching, we combined data from
the best-matched subjects (total n = 14) of Experiment 4A (n =
6) and Experiment 4B (n = 8) to maintain similar power. The
absolute difference between cued and uncued d′was taken as a
measure of matching. We ranked subjects accordingly and
half of the subjects of each experiment with the smallest dif-
ferences in unbiased and biased conditions were included in
the joint analysis presented in Fig. 9. Sensitivity (d′) for this
subset of the data was matched between cued and uncued
trials (paired t tests, unbiased, T(13) = 0.61, P = 0.55,
CI=[−0.40,0.72]; biased T(13) = 0.58, P = 0.57, CI=[−0.41,
0.72]; Fig. 9a). See Figure S4 in the Supplemental Information
for hit and false alarm rates.
Even when we imposed these conservative constraints to
the data analysis, ensuring that we only considered subjects
whose d′ was reasonably matched (unbiased condition mean
difference between cued and uncued sensitivity = 0.16, biased
condition mean difference = 0.15), we still found the same
response patterns. Response bias c was not different between
attentional conditions in either bias condition (paired t tests
between cued and uncued conditions, unbiased: T(13) = 0.19,
P = 0.85, CI = [−0.19,0.23]; biased: T(13) = 1.91, P = 0.08, CI
= [−0.01,0.22]; Fig. 9b). In the unbiased condition, cued and
uncued trials were near optimal (t test against value zero,
T(13) = 0.56, P = 0.59, CI = [−0.19,0.32]; T(13) = 1.21, P =
0.25, CI = [−0.12,0.43], respectively), and subjects still strug-
gled to shift their response bias significantly towards optimal-
ity only in uncued trials (Fig. 9c). Importantly, as in all the
previous experiments, we found an interaction between atten-
tion and bias: 2×2 repeated measures ANOVA, F(1,13) = 4.5,
P = 0.05.
Discussion
In these experiments we found that subjects did not fail to shift
their logβ due to low sensitivity or due to being frustrated
during uncued trials, since their sensitivity was equally good
as in cued trials and the constant feedback makes it
Fig. 7 Results for Experiment 3. a Detection sensitivity (d′) was lower
than uncued d′ in Experiment 2 and it was not different between
conditions. b Response bias measured by c. c In the unbiased condition,
logβwas not significantly different from optimality (dashed lined), but in
the biased condition, despite the relatively low d′, logβ shifted towards
optimality (dashed line) significantly like in the cued conditions of the
previous experiments. The two logβ values were different from each
other. Solid bars indicate subjects’ means and error bars indicate SEM.
** P < 0.01 ***P < 0.001
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implausible to think they were not aware of their good perfor-
mance. On the other hand, our model’s assumptions (i.e., a
common criterion for cued and uncued trials and the reduction
of variance by attention), account for the observed results as
predicted a priori (Fig. 8).
Experiment 5: The effect is preserved with a simpler
display
While the diagonal arrangement of the stimuli has been suc-
cessfully used before with the purpose of minimizing eye
movements (Bahrami et al., 2007; Rahnev et al., 2011), hav-
ing multiple items in the display could have made the task
unnecessarily difficult. In order to dispel this worry, in
Experiment 5 we used a simpler display.
Experiment and task design
In Experiment 5 we used a similar experimental setup to the
one used in Experiment 1, except that participants (n = 11,
three women) saw just two stimuli, instead of four, 5° away of
fixation on opposite horizontal directions. A single-headed
arrow pointed to just one of them, thus minimizing items on
the screen as well as subjects’ attentional effort (Fig. 10).
Accordingly, the probe was just one circle that overlapped
with the spatial location of one of the stimuli. Attentional
and biasing format were just as in Experiment 1,
Fig. 8 Model predictions for Biased Condition in Experiments 4A and
4B. This is the same as Fig. 3 but in Experiments 4A and 4B the contrast
of the unattended location was titrated to equate sensitivity (see
Experiment and Task Design). This was accounted for in the models
increasing the distance between the distributions P(x|S1) and P(x|S2) to
compensate for the larger variance in the unattended condition.
Parameters of the distributions are arbitrary
Fig. 9 Results for Experiments 4A and 4B combined. a Data from
subjects (n = 14) with best-matched sensitivity were analyzed (see
Experiment and Task Design for Experiment 4 for details). Sensitivity
(d′) was matched between cued and uncued trials. b Response bias
measured by c. c In the unbiased condition, logβ for cued and uncued
trials was near optimality. In the biased condition, in spite of having
similar sensitivity, logβ shifted towards optimality in the cued and not
in the uncued trials. Solid bars indicate means and error bars SEM.
*P≤0.05
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counterbalancing left and right bias across subjects. The same
grating contribution to total contrast (9 %; median value used
in Experiments 1 and 2) was used throughout a single session
for all stimuli.
Results
Overall discrimination sensitivity differed, as expected given
the different attentional conditions, in both unbiased (paired t
test, T(10) = 4.23, P = 0.002, CI = [0.99,3.2]) and biased
conditions (T(10) = 4.7, P = 0.0008, CI = [1.2,3.4];
Fig. 11a). Again, we were able to find the response bias
shifting patters from the previous experiments using this min-
imal display.
Response bias c was not significantly different between
attentional conditions in either bias condition (paired t tests
between cued and uncued conditions, unbiased: T(10) = 0.73,
P = 0.48, CI = [−0.31,0.15]; biased: T(10) = 1.6, P = 0.14, CI
= [−0.69,0.11]; Fig. 11b). In the unbiased condition, logβwas
optimal for cued and uncued trials as predicted by our model (t
tests against value zero, T(10) = −0.29, P = 0.77, CI = [−0.60,
0.46] and T(10) = −0.67, P = 0.52, CI = [−0.40,0.21], respec-
tively). In the biased condition, logβwas optimal only in cued
but not in the uncued trials and, importantly, we were able to
find an interaction between attention and bias: 2×2 repeated
measures ANOVA, F(1,10) = 10.59, P = 0.02; Fig. 11c. See
Figure S5 in the Supplemental Information for hit and false
alarm rates.
Further data analysis
A potential worry about all the experimental results is that
stimulus adaptation could be a confound. In the biased condi-
tion, one stimulus orientation appears more frequently than
the other. Adaptation reduces stimulus salience, but attention
can overcome adaptation restoring contrast sensitivity
(Pestilli, Viera, & Carrasco, 2007). Uncued trials, then, would
have been more affected by adaptation and possibly prevented
subjects from incorporating priors into their responses in a
way not related to our model. A similar worry is that subjects
could have tried to balance their responses in uncued trials,
thereby avoiding the most frequent response in the most fre-
quent and salient trials (i.e., cued trials) and subsequently re-
ducing the (more optimal) shift in their response bias (Akaishi,
Umeda, Nagase, & Sakai, 2014).
We first note that the structure of our experiments makes
both possibilities unlikely to account for our results. Briefly
presented stimuli, like the ones we used, usually do not gen-
erate substantial adaptation (Patterson, Wissig, & Kohn,
2013). Further, the orientation of the gratings changed ran-
domly every trial in cued and uncued trials alike, minimizing
the probability of stimulus adaptation. Also, cued and uncued
trials were interleaved, making it unlikely that subjects would
avoid the more frequent response (in the cued trials) trying to
somehow balance their responses in the uncued trials. The
more frequent tilt was proportionally split between cued and
uncued targets such that 70 % of cued and 70 % of uncued
targets were tilted to the same side, making Bthe most frequent
response^ proportionally the same in both conditions.
Furthermore, subjects received trial-by-trial feedback and the
same results were obtained when the uncued stimuli were
discriminated just as well as the cued ones in Experiments
4A and 4B, completely ruling out the possibility of explaining
our results by subjects responding randomly during uncued
trials.
However, to further rule out both possibilities we per-
formed an analysis of stimulus adaptation and response com-
pensation (Fig. 12). For measuring adaptation, we calculated
the conditional probability (CP1) of each trial’s response be-
ing equal to the most frequent stimulus given that the preced-
ing stimulus at the same location was the same as the most
frequent stimulus. Then, we subtracted from CP1 the condi-
tional probability (CP2) of the response being equal to the
most frequent stimulus given that the preceding stimulus on
the same location was different from the most frequent stim-
ulus. Formally,
Fig. 10 Task design for Experiment 5. This is similar to the task in
Experiment 1, but with two single stimuli on the horizontal of fixation.
A single contrast was used throughout a unique session for all the stimuli.
An uncued trial is depicted
2032 Atten Percept Psychophys (2015) 77:2021–2036
AdaptationIndex
¼ P Rn ¼ S1jSn−1 ¼ S1ð Þ−P Rn ¼ S1jSn−1 ¼ S2ð Þ ð8Þ
where Rn is the response in a given trial, S1 is the most and S2
the least frequent stimulus, respectively, and Sn-1 is the identity
of the stimulus in the same location in the preceding trial.
A similar analysis was performed for response compensa-
tion, except that instead of Sn-1, we used Rn-1, that is, subjects’
response in the preceding trial:
CompensationIndex
¼ P Rn ¼ S1jRn−1 ¼ S1ð Þ−P Rn ¼ S1jRn−1 ¼ S2ð Þ ð9Þ
If there was no adaptation or if there was no response com-
pensation, the difference of the two relevant conditional prob-
abilities should equal zero. A positive Adaptation Index value
would mean there is positive priming and a negative value
would mean there is repulsion. As expected for this kind of
briefly presented stimuli, the Adaptation Index was not
Fig. 11 Results for Experiment 5. a Detection sensitivity (d′) differed in
the unbiased and biased conditions. b Response bias measured by c. c In
the unbiased condition, logβ was optimal for cued and uncued trials and
not different from each other. In the biased condition, logβ was optimal
only in cued but not in the uncued trials. Solid bars indicate means and
error bars SEM. *P < 0.05 **P < 0.01 ***P < 0.001
Fig. 12 Analysis of stimulus adaptation and response compensation in
the biased conditions. We estimated stimulus adaptation by comparing
subjects response on a given trial depending onwhether the most frequent
stimulus was presented in the previous trial or not. If there was no
adaptation the Adaptation Index should equal zero (see Further data
analysis section for details). Adaptation Index was not significantly
different from zero in the biased condition of all experiments and,
importantly, it did not differ between the cued and uncued conditions.
A similar analysis was performed for response compensation. Instead of
the identity of the stimulus in the previous trial we used the previous
response to estimate the degree to which subjects compensate for giving
a more frequent response. The only case where Compensation Index was
different from zero (P = 0.01) was for the cued condition in Experiment 1.
However, the difference with the uncued condition was not significant
(P = 0.09). Therefore, adaptation and response compensation cannot
account for the lack of shift in response bias during uncued trials in any
of the experiments. Solid bars indicate means and error bars SEM.
*P = 0.01
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significantly different from zero in the biased condition of any
of the experiments (P > 0.05 in all Experiments) and, impor-
tantly, it did not differ between the cued and uncued condi-
tions (P > 0.05 in all Experiments) (Fig. 12, top). Similarly, a
positive Compensation Index would mean subjects were
biased to repeat the response equal to the most frequent
stimulus, while a negative value would mean there was
some tendency to avoid the response equal to the most fre-
quent stimulus. Again, as expected, subjects were not biased
in any direction in all the uncued conditions, ruling out alter-
native explanations of our results based on subjects just guess-
ing in uncued trials (Fig. 12, bottom). For the cued condition
in Experiment 1 subjects deviated from zero bias (P = 0.1),
sticking to the most frequent response in a mild way
(Compensation Index mean was less than 0.1 and, in any case,
positive). Further, the difference with the uncued condition
was not significant (P = 0.09). Summarizing, in all the exper-
iments the cued and uncued conditions were not significantly
different from each other by either the Adaptation or the
Compensation Index measures, eliminating the worry that
the lack of shift in response bias during uncued trials can be
explained by stimulus adaptation or response compensation.
General discussion
Taken together, the results from these six experiments confirm
the counter-intuitive predictions of our Common Criterion
Model. These predictions (Figs. 3 and 8) are counter-
intuitive because at first glance they appear to defy the com-
monsensical Bayesian principle that during uncertainty, prior
stimulus probability should have a bigger impact on optimal
observers’ perceptual decisions when the sensory signal is
weak.We by nomeans claim that all specific Bayesianmodels
are falsified by the findings we present here—rather, we hope
our results can inform the arbitration among these models.
Within the scope of perception and action during uncertain-
ty, many studies have shown that human subjects can perform
psychophysical tasks in a near-optimal fashion (Bogacz,
Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006; Ernst & Banks,
2002; Knill & Pouget, 2004; Körding & Wolpert, 2006;
Trommershäuser, Maloney, & Landy, 2008), particularly in
the context of combining prior expectation with sensory infor-
mation (Körding & Wolpert, 2004). Importantly, however, it
also has been shown that when subjects had to learn the cat-
egory structure and the base-rates of a task through continuous
sampling, they started the task behaving suboptimally
(Maddox & Bohil, 1998). Yet, they became optimal after a
few hundred trials (possibly due to the lack of attentional
manipulations and to stimulus presentation above threshold),
which is something our subjects were unable to do, in some
cases even after thousands of trials. This points to the possi-
bility that asking subjects to keep track during a single task of
both attended and unattended targets may pose a unique con-
straint to the perceptual decision system.
Our predictions rest on a simple signal detection theoretic
model with two assumptions: that attention reduces the vari-
ability of internal perceptual response, and that subjects use a
common decision criterion to classify both the attended and
unattended stimuli. The assumption of variance reduction is
supported by recent research (Bressler & Silver, 2010; Pestilli
et al., 2011;Wyart et al., 2012). From a computational point of
view, attention has recently been interpreted as facilitating
inferring the level of uncertainty or precision during hierarchi-
cal perception, thus minimizing the error prediction signal
(Feldman & Friston, 2010). At a neuronal circuitry level, it
has recently been found that attention reduces the pairwise
noise correlation between neurons (Cohen & Maunsell,
2009; Mitchell, Sundberg, & Reynolds, 2009). If we assume
that the population response is somewhat monotonically relat-
ed to the average spike rate of individual neurons, reduction of
pairwise noise correlation would mean a less variable popula-
tion response, because reduced pairwise noise correlation
could mean noise is averaged out more effectively (Zohary,
Shadlen, & Newsome, 1994).
The other assumption of a common criterion is also sup-
ported by previous empirical work within signal detection
theoretic (Gorea & Sagi, 2000) and neurophysiological frame-
works (Fetsch, Kiani, Newsome, & Shadlen, 2014).
Nevertheless, in a recent study, Qamar et al. (2013) found that
subjects are able to incorporate trial-to-trial knowledge of dif-
ferent levels of sensory uncertainty when setting their decision
boundaries, with some subjects even performing almost opti-
mally. However, it is important to note that in our experiments
subjects experienced two stimuli with different degrees of
noise (attention) in the same trial, while in Qamar et al.’s ex-
periments subjects saw a single stimulus in every trial and
uncertainty changed from trial-to-trial (due to contrast varia-
tions). The simultaneous presentation of an attended and an
unattended stimulus is a crucial part of our task design, as our
model’s assumption concerns a common criterion of two si-
multaneous sets of distributions of which subjects have to
keep track.
In terms of neural mechanisms, one way to conceptualize
how decision criteria are implemented is to consider the feed-
forward connectivity from sensory to decisional regions in the
frontal and parietal cortices. For instance, in a discrimination
task, a biased criterion towards stimulus S1 means that for the
same level of sensory activation, the decision area is more
likely to produce an S1 response than an S2 response, which
in turn would mean the feed-forward connectivity is strong.
This could be implemented by means of more excitable neu-
rons in the decision areas when the discrimination criterion is
biased. Alternatively, sensory information processing could be
biased by altering the starting point of the evidence accumu-
lation process (Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, &
2034 Atten Percept Psychophys (2015) 77:2021–2036
Forstmann, 2012) or its drift rate (van Ravenzwaaij, Mulder,
Tuerlinckx, & Wagenmakers, 2012). If discrimination criteri-
on is to be understood in one of these ways, in a context where
the stimuli are mixed along a single experiment such that the
decision circuitry has to read out potentially from either the
cued or the uncued sensory representations, the same criterion
(or two very similar criteria) will be applied to both. This is
because the decision circuitry may not have the resolution to
distinguish between the cued and uncued representations by
significantly changing the respective feed-forward connectiv-
ity by the time subjects are asked to respond. When decision
neurons are highly excitable, they may be excitable at very
similar rates for both cued and uncued stimuli.
There are several limitations to our model, as it is intended
to be simple. The notion of a single, common decision crite-
rion can be further specified in order to avoid potential over-
simplifications. It is perhaps more biologically realistic to say
that the two decision criteria for the cued and uncued stimuli
are very similar, rather than being constrained to be identical
(Zak et al., 2012). The identity assumption should be consid-
ered a computational convenience of the model and also a tool
of higher theoretical value since it allowed us to make empir-
ical predictions that would have been impossible assuming
two independent criteria. While it is possible that the brain
applies different criteria for cued and uncued trials, it is bio-
logically unrealistic that the firing thresholds implementing
the criteria are extremely different during the same trial.
A related question arises regarding the factors that deter-
mine the common criterion’s value. In our experiments, the
common criterion was placed on or short of the optimal re-
sponse bias value for attended trials. This agrees with previous
evidence that response bias tends to be conservative (Gorea &
Sagi, 2000; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman,
2005; Rahnev et al., 2011). However, it is still open why the
criterion was closer to the attended optimal response bias val-
ue and not, for example, midway between the optimal
attended and unattended optimal response biases. One possi-
bility is that since attended stimuli were probed more often
than unattended ones they were given preference when setting
the common criterion. This pre-eminence of attended stimuli
is ecologically valid too, since humans and other animals tend
to solve problems and control their behavior guided by atten-
tion, and only infrequently they have to react to unattended
stimuli in the environment. We emphasize that this is a spec-
ulative account that requires further evidential support.
Another concern is that our model’s assumption that the
internal response distributions are Gaussian might not hold.
Recent reports show that in attentional tasks with multiple
items the precision of the internal representation itself could
be a random variable, perhaps due to fluctuations in attention
(Mazyar, van den Berg, & Ma, 2012; Mazyar, van den Berg,
Seilheimer, & Ma, 2013; van den Berg, Shin, Chou, George,
& Ma, 2012). Nevertheless, as can be inferred from Fig. 1, as
long as the distributions remain roughly similar for cued and
uncued stimuli, the same qualitative predictions would contin-
ue to hold. Our model’s predictions depend critically on a
reduction in variance by attention paired with a common de-
cision criterion but not on the specific shape of the distribu-
tions. Further, Experiment 5 suggests that our main finding
cannot be solely attributable to alterations in the shape of the
distributions of the internal representations because reducing
the number of displayed stimuli (which should have lead to
changes in the internal representations) did not affect the re-
sponse bias patterns seen throughout our experiments.
Conclusions
Here we put to a test a signal detection theoretic model that
parsimoniously predicted a priori that subjects would not op-
timally incorporate the priors into their perceptual judgments
in unattended trials during a detection task where attended and
unattended trials were interleaved. These results suggest that
the commonsensical notion of optimal criterion setting may
not apply to situations as common as inattention. Future
modeling efforts should shed light on the cognitive constraints
faced by the observer in dealing with situations where stimuli
have different statistical properties or where there is different
variability of internal responses, which may account for this
interesting pattern of behavior that may seem Bsuboptimal^
from the outset.
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